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Conclusion
For those approaching retirement with a substantial
inventory of zero basis commodities, the procedure outlined
in the 1993 letter ruling may pose an attractive alternative if
it is desired to benefit a favorite charitable organization and
still receive an income benefit in retirement.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 37.04[3][a]
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.06[2][b]
(1995). See also Harl, "Gifts of Grain and Other Farm
Commodities," 4 Agric. L. Dig. 25 (1993).
2 Ltr. Rul. 9210004, Nov. 29, 1991; Ltr. Rul. 9229002,
February 28, 1992.
3 See Ltr. Rul. 9413020, Dec. 22, 1993 (transfers to
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4 I.R.C. § 162.
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6 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4).
7 Id.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(4), Ex. 5.
9 December 22, 1993.
10 See Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3; Rev. Rul. 72-395, 1972-2
C.B. 340, as modified.
11 Ltr. Rul. 9413020, Dec. 22, 1993.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
GROSS ESTATE . The debtors filed for Chapter 11 and
their assets included a potato farm. The debtors had post-
petition income from the farm and wage income from the
debtors' employment as an airline pilot and airline hostess.
The debtors expended money from the wage income for
personal expenses and an unsecured creditor objected to the
expenditures as use of estate property. The creditor argued
that all of the debtors' income was estate property because
the debtors-in-possession owed a fiduciary duty to the
unsecured creditors to apply all income to payment of
creditors. The creditor allowed that the debtors could
receive compensation for their efforts in gathering and
preserving estate assets. The court held that Section
541(a)(6) excepted post-petition personal wages from estate
property where the employment was not under the business
entity in bankruptcy. The court acknowledged a split of
authority on the issue. The case points out one advantage of
use of Chapter 11 over Chapter 12 where debtors are
required to apply all disposable income to the Chapter 12
plan payments. In re Powell, 187 B.R. 642 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1995).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. The debtors were
farmers who had purchased feed from a feed supplier on a
line of credit established by three separate agreements. The
first agreement ran from April 1993 to November 1993 and
the debtors paid off all purchases on the due date in
November. In November 1993, the line of credit was again
established by an agreement and purchases were made
through March 1994. Payment under that agreement was
due in June 1994 but was not paid on time. Instead an
additional line of credit was established and further
purchases were made through September 1994. By
September 1994, the debtors were in financial difficulty and
sold their herd of cattle. The cattle proceeds were paid to the
feed supplier on the November 1993 line of credit 77 days
before the debtors filed for bankruptcy. The trustee sought
to recover this payment as a preferential transfer. The court
found that no issue of fact remained that the payment was a
preferential transfer. The feed supplier argued, however,
that the payment was made in the ordinary course of
business. The court held that the payment was not made in
the ordinary course of business in that the payment was
made late, the money was obtained through the unusual
means of liquidating the debtors' few assets, and the
payment resulted in one creditor receiving more than 50
percent of its claim when other unsecured creditors would
receive nothing on their claims. In re Freeny, 187 B.R. 711
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995).
SETOFF. The debtor had a checking account with a
bank to which the debtor also owed money on a loan. When
the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the bank placed an
administrative hold on the funds in the checking account
equal to the amount owed by the debtor. The bank also
applied for relief from the automatic stay and for setoff of
the funds. The court held that the administrative hold did not
violate the automatic stay because the hold did not
absolutely transfer the funds from the debtor to the bank.
Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Stumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286
(1995), rev'g, 37 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'g, 138 B.R.
792 (D. Md. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had completed all
Chapter 13 payments and received a discharge of their
claims, including their tax claims. However, the IRS filed a
post-discharge Notice of Levy against the debtors for the tax
claims discharged in bankruptcy. The debtors filed a motion
for finding the IRS in contempt and sought an award of
attorney's fees for the cost of bringing the motion. The
attorney's fee award was based on a rate of $227 per hour.
The IRS argued that the hourly rate was limited to $75
under Section 106 which incorporated 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). The court held that the debtors were entitled
to an award of attorney's fee but required an evidentiary
hearing to determine the rate, based on the base rate of $75
plus any additional amounts allowed under Section
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2412(d)(2)(A). In re Moulton, 187 B.R. 758 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1995).
DISCHARGE. The IRS sought to have the debtor's
taxes due for 1989 declared nondischargeable for failure to
file a return for those taxes. The IRS filed a Certificate of
Assessments and Payments which showed that the IRS
prepared a substitute return for the debtor for 1989 and
made an assessment based on that return. However, the IRS
did not provide evidence of any records check to determine
whether or not a return was received. The debtor filed an
affidavit of the tax return preparer that the return was
prepared and delivered to the debtor with a pre-addressed
postage-paid envelope and instructions for filing. The debtor
testified that the return was immediately mailed. The court
held that the debtor provided evidence sufficient to prevent
granting the IRS summary judgment on the issue. Although
the court indicates that the IRS had the burden to show that
the return was not filed, the court also indicated that such
proof was easily provided by a records search. In re
Conner, 187 B.R. 217 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995).
NET OPERATING LOSSES.  The debtor made
elections to carry forward net operating losses on income
tax returns filed pre- and post-bankruptcy for pre-
bankruptcy taxable years.  The bankruptcy trustee filed
amended returns for those years with the net operating
losses carried back, entitling the estate to refunds.  The IRS
denied the refund requests, citing the irrevocability of the
elections.  The trustee argued that the elections were
avoidable preferential transfers.  The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a trustee in bankruptcy may revoke the
debtor's net operating loss carryforward election without
approval from the IRS. The case was remanded to determine
whether the NOL elections were avoidable under the
preferential transfer rules. The District Court held that the
pre-bankruptcy election was avoidable because the debtor
did not receive any value for the election since the debtor
had no prospects for taxable income within the next few
years. Similarly, the court also held that the post-bankruptcy
election was void for violating Section 549(a) because the
election was not made in the ordinary course of business
since the debtor's situation was the same as when the pre-
petition election was made.  Streetman v. United States,
187 B.R. 287 (W.D. Ark. 1995), rev'g unrep. Bankr. Ct.
dec. on rem. from unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g and rev'g, 154
B.R. 723 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992), on rem. from, In re
Russell, 927 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1991).
NOTICE TO IRS . The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and
the notice for the filing of claims was sent to the IRS service
center where the debtor sent tax returns. The IRS
acknowledged receipt of the notice but failed to file a claim
until 11 months after the bar date for claims. The IRS did
not present any reason for the delay and did not request an
extension of time to file the claim. The IRS argued that the
notice was not adequate because the notice was not sent to
the special procedures section in Pittsburgh. The court found
that the local bankruptcy rules contained no provision for
notices to the IRS in Pittsburgh and held that the notice to
the service center was adequate. In re Benny's Leasing,
Inc., 187 B.R. 484 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
REFUND. The debtors failed to file income tax returns
for 1990 and 1991 until after filing for bankruptcy in
November 1994. The returns claimed a refund for both
years but the IRS rejected the claims because the returns
were filed more than three years after they were due. The
debtors claimed that the refunds were estate property and
the IRS's failure to pay the refunds was a violation of the
automatic stay. The court held that the automatic stay
provisions did not apply because the debtors' claim was
actually for a turnover of estate funds, governed by Section
542(a). The court also held that the turnover of funds was
governed by applicable nonbankruptcy law. In this case,
I.R.C. § 6513 required claims for refunds to be filed within
three years after the tax return was due; therefore, no refund
was required and the IRS did not have to turn over the
refunds to the estate. In re Dougherty, 187 B.R. 883
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
CONTRACTS
GOOD FAITH. The plaintiff operated a swine breeding
operation and contracted with the defendant for the purchase
of new breeding stock from 1989 through 1994. The
purchase contracts contained language that the defendant
did not guarantee that the breeding stock did not have any
pathogens or disease and that the defendant's liability was
limited to replacement of defective swine. The contract also
contained language that the contract contained all
agreements between the parties, either written or oral. The
plaintiff discovered in 1993 that some of the swine provided
by the defendant were infected with Porcine Reproductive
and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS); however, the plaintiff
accepted new deliveries of the defendant's swine. The
plaintiff alleged that an agent of the defendant orally
warranted that the defendant's swine were free of PRRS and
that this oral statement was an actionable fraud on the
plaintiff. The court held that, given the clear contract
language that the contract represented the sole agreement
between the parties, any reliance by the plaintiff on the oral
statement of the agent was not reasonable. The plaintiff also
argued that the selling of PRRS infected swine violated the
general duty of good faith by the defendant. The court held
that the clear language of the contract specifically assigned
the risk of disease to the plaintiff and limited the defendant's
liability to replacement of diseased swine. Rayle Tech, Inc.
v. Dekalb Swine Breeders, 897 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D. Ga.
1995).
LIMITED WARRANTY . The plaintiff purchased a
cattle feed grinder manufactured by the defendant. The
grinder was sold with a warranty limited to repairing or
replacing defective parts. The warranty specifically
disclaimed any further warranties or liability for
consequential damages. The grinder was discovered to not
mix the ground feed uniformly and the plaintiff's milk cows
had decreased milk production. The defendant attempted to
repair the grinder but eventually left it to the plaintiff to fix.
When all efforts failed, the plaintiff brought suit for lost
milk production. The court held that the jury had sufficient
evidence to find that the grinder failed in its essential
purpose, to uniformly grind and mix feed; therefore, the
limited warranty was inoperative and the defendant was
liable for the standard UCC warranty provisions. The court
also upheld the jury award for lost milk production based on
adequate evidence of the plaintiff's milk production records.
Severn v. Sperry Corp., 538 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
restrictions on the use of the crop endorsement for wheat,
barley, oats, rye, corn, corn silage, soybeans, grain sorghum,
flaxseed, cotton, sunflower seed, figs and malting barley for
the 1995 and succeeding crops and for sugarcane for 1996
and succeeding years. These crop endorsement provisions
will be covered by the Common Crop Insurance regulations.
60 Fed. Reg. 56933 (Nov. 13, 1995).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations expanding the
prevented planting benefits available under the hybrid seed,
small grain, cotton, extra long staple cotton, sunflower seed,
and coarse grain insurance policies. 60 Fed. Reg. 56257
(Nov. 8, 1995).
IMPORTS. The CFSA has issued proposed regulations
concerning the End-Use Certificate Program under NAFTA.
The proposed regulations extend the deadlines for reporting
requirements and provide alternative reporting methods for
imports governed by NAFTA. 60 Fed. Reg. 57198 (Nov.
14, 1995).
TOBACCO. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
requiring tobacco producers to purchase crop insurance in
order to be eligible for tobacco price support program
benefits. 60 Fed. Reg. 57164 (Nov. 14, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DEFICIENCY NOTICE. The decedents, husband and
wife, died within a few days of each other. The decedent's
daughter acted as executrix for both estates and filed estate
and gift tax returns for both estates with some errors in
making the split gift election. The IRS issued a notice of
deficiency based on the incomplete split gift elections and
increased valuation of some estate property. The executrix
filed a request under I.R.C. § 7517 for a written statement
explaining the property valuation. The executrix did not
receive this statement. The executrix argued that the notice
of deficiency was invalid because the IRS failed to make a
valid determination based on an actual examination of the
record and because the IRS failed to respond to the Section
7517 request. The court found that, although the IRS notice
was not complete, the notice was sufficient. The court also
ruled that the IRS's failure to respond to the Section 7517
request was not grounds for invalidating the notice because
the statute did not provide any enforcement sanction for
failure to respond. Estate of Rickman v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-545.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* Prior to 1985, a decedent had established a trust
under a general power of appointment. The trust provided
fractional shares for each of the decedent's children and
granted the beneficiaries a limited power of appointment
over each share of the trust. The trustees sought a state court
ruling construing the trust in four areas- (1) a beneficiary
could exercise the limited power of appointment to create
another power of appointment, (2) a beneficiary could
exercise the limited power of appointment to create another
interest in trust, (3) if a beneficiary did not exercise the
power of appointment, a succeeding beneficiary also has a
limited power of appointment over the share of the trust, and
(4) the trustees were authorized to make discretionary
distributions of principal to the beneficiaries. The IRS ruled
that a judicial construction would not cause a trust to be
subject to GSTT so long as the construction was consistent
with how the highest court in the state would construe the
trust. The IRS ruled that, because the first two constructions
would be consistent with what the IRS believes the highest
state court would rule, the first two constructions would not
subject the trust to GSTT. Because the last two
constructions were not consistent with what the IRS
believes the highest court in the state would rule, the last
two constructions would subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr.
Rul. 9545009, Aug. 11, 1995.
IRA. The decedent's estate included funds in an IRA
which named the decedent's estate as remainder beneficiary.
The decedent's will bequeathed the residuary estate to the
decedent's surviving spouse. The will also provided that the
surviving spouse as executor had the discretion to chose
how to fund the will bequests from estate property. In
satisfaction of the residuary bequest, the surviving spouse as
executor caused the IRA to be transferred to the surviving
spouse's IRA by a direct trustee-to-trustee transfer. The IRS
ruled that the surviving spouse did not need to include the
transferred IRA funds in income because the IRA funds
were not received from the estate. The IRS stated that if the
IRA had passed to the estate and was transferred from the
estate to the surviving spouse's IRA, the funds would be
included in the surviving spouse's income under I.R.C. §
408(d)(3). Ltr. Rul. 9545010, Aug. 14, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent's will bequeathed all property to the decedent's
children. The decedent's surviving spouse filed for a portion
of the estate under state law for a surviving spouse. Instead
of pursuing costly litigation, the executor reached a
settlement with the surviving spouse to transfer estate
property to a trust for the surviving spouse's life. The
surviving spouse was to receive all trust income at least
annually and the spouse had the power to require the sale of
unproductive assets and the investment in productive assets.
The remainder of the trust principal passed to the decedent's
children. The IRS ruled that the payments to the surviving
spouse were made in settlement of enforceable rights and
the trust qualified as QTIP. The estate would be allowed a
marital deduction for the fair market value of the trust assets
if the appropriate  election was made. Ltr. Rul. 9546004,
Aug. 11, 1995.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent owned a 26 percent limited partnership interest in
a cattle ranch. The estate elected to value the decedent’s
interest in the partnership land using special use valuation.
In determining the special use valuation deduction amount,
the estate first determined the fair market value of all
partnership property and allocated 26 percent of the
decedent's estate. The decedent's share was then discounted
30 percent for a minority interest and lack of marketability.
The estate then determined the special use valuation of the
partnership property and allocated 26 percent of that amount
to the decedent. Because the difference in values exceeded
the maximum special use valuation reduction amount, the
value of the decedent's interest in the partnership (including
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the 30 percent discount) was reduced by the maximum
reduction amount of $750,000. Citing, Estate of Maddox v.
Comm'r, 93 T.C. 228 (1989), the Tax Court held that the
estate could not claim a minority discount if a special use
valuation election is made. The appellate court reversed,
holding that no statute or regulation prevented the use of
discounting factors in determining the fair market value of
interests in partnerships for purposes of the special use
valuation election.  Under the court's reasoning, an estate
would use the lesser of the value from special use valuation
or the value after the discount for minority interest and non-
marketability unless the $750,000 special use valuation limit
was reached. In that event, the minoirty and non-
marketability discount would be applied first witht he
$750,000 subtracted from that figure. Although not
specifically discussed by either court, I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2)
places a limitation on reduction of estate tax value only as to
the reduction resulting from application of the special use
valuation and does not mention reductions of fair market
value from other factors. Note: The Digest will publish an
article by Dr. Harl on this case in the near future. Est. of
Hoover v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,217
(10th Cir. 1995), rev'g,  102 T.C. 777 (1994).
TRANSFEREE'S LIABILITY. The taxpayers received
a gift of real property worth $93,300 in 1983. In the same
year, the donor gave another property to the taxpayer's
brother. The IRS later determined that the second gift was
undervalued for gift tax purposes. The value of the second
gift was eventually determined by the Tax Court and the
IRS assessed the taxpayers $93,300 for their portion of the
unpaid taxes. The taxpayers argued that the resulting lien
against the property decreased its value. The court rejected
this argument and held that the taxpayer's were liable for the
full value of the gift when made. Ripley v. Comm'r, 105
T.C. No. 23 (1995).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION-ALM § 4.03[7].* The
taxpayers were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The
corporation made a bona fide loan from the taxpayers which
was outstanding at the beginning of 1987. During 1987, the
corporation became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy. The
taxpayers decided not to file a claim for their loan in the
bankruptcy case because the claim would jeopardize the
taxpayers' chances of retaining the business. The taxpayers
claimed a bad debt deduction for the outstanding balance of
the loan. The court held that the taxpayers had failed to
demonstrate that the debt became worthless in that if the
claim had been filed in the bankruptcy case, the taxpayers
would have received at least a partial recovery. In addition,
the value of the claim was demonstrated by the taxpayers'
willingness to trade it for retention of the company.  Cox v.
Comm'r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,595 (5th Cir.
1995), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1994-189.
FORECLOSURE SALE. The taxpayers defaulted on a
loan secured by property. The creditor foreclosed against the
property and the property was sold. The property was
purchased by another creditor of the taxpayers which held
the second mortgage on the property. The taxpayers claimed
that they did not receive the proceeds of the foreclosure sale
and that the second creditor merely purchased the first
creditor's loan; therefore, no sale occurred to cause
realization of gain by the taxpayers. The court held that the
foreclosure sale event determined whether a sale occurred
and that the taxpayers realized gain on the difference
between their basis in the property and the sale price of the
foreclosure sale. Cox v. Comm'r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,595 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1994-
189.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
operated a cattle ranch and was disallowed business
deductions in excess of income from the activity because the
court held that the taxpayer had not operated the activity for
profit. The court found that the taxpayer had made little
effort to reverse the years of losses, had not consulted any
experts and did not keep records sufficient to operate the
business profitably. Scales v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
544.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period January 1, 1996 through March 31, 1996, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent and for
underpayments is 9 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 11 percent. Note:
the GATT legislation reduces the interest rate on
overpayments above $10,000 by 1.5 percentage points. Rev.
Rul. 95-78, I.R.B 1995-49.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
GROSS INCOME. The taxpayer was a general
partnership involved in the practice of law. The taxpayer
used the cash method of accounting and deducted as
business expenses amounts paid for clients as part of legal
representations and later included in income the amounts
reimbursed by clients for those same expenses. The IRS
audited the taxpayer and determined that the expenses were
to be treated as loans such that the expenses were not
deductible and the reimbursements were not included in
income. However, because the statute of limitations had
expired for tax years previous to 1989, the IRS included in
income the reimbursements received in 1989 for expenses
deducted prior to 1989. The taxpayer argued that such
treatment of the reimbursements was inconsistent with the
IRS ruling that the original expenses were loans. The Tax
Court had held that the reimbursements were included in
income under the consistency doctrine. The appellate court
agreed in the result but held that the tax benefit rule applied.
The Tax Court had rejected the use of the tax benefit rule
because the original expense deduction had been improper.
The appellate court rejected the "improper deduction"
exception to the tax benefit rule. Hughes & Luce,L.L.P. v.
Comm'r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,614 (5th Cir.
1995), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1995-559.
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayers were involved in
several forms of business providing legal and business
advice. The taxpayers included income from Schedule C
and their shares of S corporation income in determining the
amount of allowable deduction for contributions to a Keogh
plan. The IRS disallowed the deductions attributable to the
income from the S corporation. The court held that the term
"self-employment income" for purposes of the Keogh
deduction did not include income from an S corporation
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because I.R.C. § 401(c)(4) did not include an S corporation
in the definition of "employer." The court noted that
separate retirement plan provisions are available for S
corporations. Durando v. Comm'r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,615 (9th Cir. 1995).
Although the taxpayer company had been treating all of
its workers as employees for purposes of FICA, FUTA,
income tax withholding and pension plan qualifications, one
employee chose to claim business-related expenses as if the
worker was an independent contractor. The worker's
deductions were challenged by the IRS but the worker
prevailed in the Tax Court. The taxpayer company sought
three rulings as a result of the Tax Court ruling. First, the
company wanted to file amended Forms W-2 with taxable
wages for the worker at zero and amended Forms 1099 with
self-employment income as the amount of wages originally
reported plus the value of benefits made available to the
worker under the company's health, medical and cafeteria
plans. The IRS ruled that the company should file these
forms as indicated. Second, the company asked for a ruling
as to whether the worker could continue to participate in the
company's 401(k) and defined benefit plans. The IRS ruled
that, because the worker was not an employee, the worker
should not be allowed to participate in or accrue benefits
under these plans. Third, the company sought a ruling that
its employee benefits plans would not be disqualified under
401(a) and 501(a) because of the Tax Court's ruling if the
company returns to the worker the worker's contributions to
the plans and revokes or cancels the worker's accrued
benefits. The IRS ruled that the plans would not be
disqualified if the company took these actions. The IRS
noted that the second and third rulings are under
reconsideration. Note: The Digest will publish an article by
Dr. Harl on this ruling in the near future. Ltr. Rul. 9546018,
Aug. 18, 1995.
For plans beginning in November 1995, the weighted
average is 7.13 percent with the permissible range of 6.42 to
7.77 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable range) and 6.42
to 7.85 percent (90 to 110  percent permissable range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-63, I.R.B. 1995-48, 8.
The IRS has issued proposed guidelines to be used for
examining employee plans for compliance with certain
distribution requirements. The guidelines will be
incorporated into the IRS Manual after opportunity for
public comments. Ann. 95-99, I.R.B. 1995-48.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
December 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.65 5.57 5.53 5.51
110% AFR 6.22 6.13 6.08 6.05
120% AFR 6.79 6.68 6.63 6.59
Mid-term
AFR 5.91 5.83 5.79 5.76
110% AFR 6.51 6.41 6.36 6.33
120% AFR 7.12 7.00 6.94 6.90
Long-term
AFR 6.36 6.26 6.21 6.18
110% AFR 7.01 6.89 6.83 6.79
120% AFR 7.65 7.51 7.44 7.40
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. The taxpayer was
an S corporation. When one of the shareholders died, stock
of the corporation was passed to a trust for one of the
shareholder's heirs. Through a failure of communication
among the corporation's attorney and accountants, the QSST
election was not filed by the trust beneficiary until after the
time for filing the election had passed. The IRS ruled that
the termination was inadvertent and that the corporation
would retain its S corporation status so long as all returns of
shareholders were consistent with the election. Ltr. Rul.
9546023, Aug. 22, 1995.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
BAILMENT. The debtor was a farm cooperative which
processed and sold food products. In order to pay off a debt
to an agent of Canadian grape growers, the debtor agreed to
process and store grapes for the growers. The agreement
specifically reserved title in the growers and prohibited the
sale of the grape concentrate without the prior written
permission of the growers. The debtor had the option to
purchase some of the concentrate, again with prior written
permission of the growers. However, the debtor sold some
of the concentrate without prior permission and paid for it
only when the sale was discovered by the growers. When
the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the growers removed their
inventory of grape concentrate from the debtor's premises
and sold it. The debtor's secured creditors claimed that the
concentrate was bankruptcy estate property because, under
Pa. C.S.A. tit 13, § 2326, the concentrate was consigned
goods and subject to the claims of the creditors while in the
debtor's possession. The court held that because the debtor
did not have the right to sell the concentrate, the processing
and storage agreement was a bailment and the concentrate
was not subject to the claims of the creditors. Glenshaw
Glass v. Ontario Grape Growers' Marketing Bd., 67
F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1995).
LANDLORD'S LIEN. This decision covered three
bankruptcy cases involving interrelated entity and individual
debtors who farmed land under leases.  The landlords
claimed priority security interests in crops produced by the
debtors based on the statutory landlord's lien, Ill.  Stat. §§
5/9-316, 5/9-317. A creditor argued that the statutory lien
did not apply because the entity debtors were not the
primary tenants under the leases and that the contract
relationship of the individual debtors with the primary
tenants was not proved. The court held that the evidence
demonstrated that the entity debtors did  farm the lands
governed by the leases and that some sort of assignment or
sublease between the individuals and their entities was
assumed; therefore, the landlord's lien attached to the crop
produced on the land. Alternatively, the court held that the
lien attached to the crop and did not depend upon the
relationship of the person or entity which farmed the land
and the tenant named in the lease. The court also held that
the debtors' signing of an ASCS "Certification of Cash
Lease" under the acreage reduction program did not effect a
waiver of the statutory lien by the landlords. In re Kevin W.
Emerick Farms, Inc., 187 B.R. 277 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1995).
